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This paper addresses the question of whether Africa is an undertrading continent. We answer this question 
using a much-improved data set for obtaining predicted trade and by employing methods that correct for 
bias in estimates of undertrading. Our results indicate that globally Africa is an underexporter in our 
preferred Heckman specification. This result is robust to the addition of various controls and the 
application of variants of the gravity model of trade. We also looked for explanations for Africa’s 
undertrading. We found that accounting for transport and communication infrastructure reduced the 
undertrading effect for Africa, and in some specifications of the gravity model, the under-trading effect 
vanished altogether. Results from a semiparametric model provided evidence of significant nonlinear 
impacts from infrastructure, and the effects for a large number of African countries was significant and 
compared favorably with the marginal effects of infrastructure in countries on other continents and in 
comparable income brackets. Using this model we also found evidence of complementarity across 
transport and communication infrastructure, implying that much greater impacts will be likely if the 
infrastructure are developed jointly rather than in isolation. 
Keywords: Gravity model; undertrading; trade related infrastructure; market access 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In debates about globalization, the utilization of trading opportunities by Africa has always been under 
contention (e.g., Sachs and Warner 1997; Rodrik 1998). Africa’s share in world exports has declined 
sharply over time from about 5.5 percent in 1975 to about 2.5 percent in 2002 (World Bank 2005), which 
indicates an increasing marginalization of Africa in world trade. However, this raises the question of 
whether the observed pattern of exports from Africa is consistent with the predicted or expected level of 
trade. 
Gravity models of trade that explain trade as a function of income levels of partners, their trading 
costs (captured by distance, trade barriers, and other variables that determine trading costs, such as 
language barriers) have been found to explain observed levels of trade quite well. The difference between 
actual and predicted trade classifies countries as undertrading, overtrading, or normal trading, depending 
on whether the difference is negative, positive, or statistically not different from zero (see Subramanian 
and Tamirisa 2001). Because undertrading is defined relative to predicted trade, it is model and data 
specific. 
However, the issue of undertrading by Africa has remained highly debated in the literature, with 
results depending on the region considered, the period included, or the methodology used (different 
variants of gravity model) for analysis. Sachs and Warner (1997) argue that Africa has missed out on 
globalization. The World Bank (2000) states that Africa’s loss in world trade has cost it almost $70 
billion a year, reflecting a failure to diversify into new products as well as a falling market share for 
traditional goods. Subramanian and Tamirisa (2001) also found support for undertrading by Africa. 
On the other side, a relatively well-developed literature argues that Africa has been trading in line 
with predicted trade or even overtrading. In a pioneering study Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) found no 
evidence that flows of trade within Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were differentially low either because of 
policy or infrastructural weakness and observed that trade tallied with of predicted levels. The low degree 
of trade among the Sub-Saharan African countries could be explained by the countries’ low levels of 
GDP. Rodrik (1998) supports this view, arguing that Africa participates in international trade as much as 
can be expected according to international benchmarks relating trade volumes to income levels, country 
size, and geography. 
Coe and Hoffmaister (1998) provide evidence in favor of Rodrik’s results by estimating a gravity 
model of bilateral trade between developing and industrial countries. Their results indicate that in the 
early 1990s Africa actually overtraded compared with developing countries in other regions. However, 
Coe and Hoffmaister point to a trend decline in African north–south trade over the past 25 years in 
marked contrast to the trend increase in Latin America and the broadly stable pattern in Asia. 
Subramanian and Tamirisa (2001) however critique Coe and Hoffmaister for not controlling for a key 
variable in their analysis: the preferential trading arrangement between the European Union and Africa 
under the Lomé Convention. 
In this paper we revisit the question of whether or not Africa is an undertrading continent. We 
answer the question using an improved data set to obtain predicted levels of trade and by employing 
methods that correct for bias in estimates of undertrading. The bias originates from zero trade particularly 
by not treating the sample of trading partners with positive trade as a selected one. Further, the literature 
previously cited focuses on exploring whether or not Africa undertrades but does not explain rigorously 
the reasons for undertrading (if obtained). We attempt to answer a question that has not been formally 
addressed in the literature: What might explain Africa’s undertrading? 
To study the issue of undertrading, we obtained predicted levels of trade using the Market Access 
Map (MAcMap) database developed jointly by the International Trade Center, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, and the World Trade Organization (Bouët et al. 2008). Compared 
with other trade protection measuring tools, the MAcMap database contains a more extensive set of trade 
protection measures—namely, the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of specific tariffs, the AVE of tariff rate 2 
 
quotas, and the AVE of antidumping duties. In addition, by accounting for all regional agreements and 
preferential schemes, the MAcMap allows for the capture of country-specific levels of market access. 
We found that both the levels and distribution of protection across countries vary significantly 
with the breadth of the measures. This points to the possibility of serious measurement error when only a 
narrow measure of protection (ad valorem tariffs) is used in gravity models of trade, as has been the 
convention. Moreover, we found that within Africa, market access varies widely across countries, even 
those covered by the same preferential arrangement, mainly because of the composition of exports. Thus, 
use of dummy membership variables to capture the effect of preferential trading arrangements again 
amounts to measurement error in market access variables. The measure of trade protection used in our 
study minimized these two measurement errors. 
In addressing the question of whether or not Africa undertrades, we used the Heckman sample 
selection method to account for zero trade flows. We found evidence that globally Africa is an 
underexporter but not an underimporter. We further tested for robustness of this result using the 
conventionally employed variants of the gravity model: the log linear and Tobit specifications. More 
importantly, underexporting by Africa does not hold in a sample of exporting countries that are low 
income (based on the World Bank classification). This motivated us to look at factors associated with 
countries being low income that could explain undertrading by Africa in a global sample. Trade-related 
infrastructure is one such factor that is likely to be a significant determinant of trade costs and hence 
exports. We found that accounting for transport and communication infrastructure in the same sample of 
countries in which Africa emerges as an undertrader reduces the undertrading effect. In fact, in some 
specifications undertrading by Africa vanishes altogether. 
The role of infrastructure in enhancing trade has been widely discussed in policy circles and in 
descriptive literature but has rarely been studied rigorously in formal literature. Bougheas et al. (1999) 
and Francois and Manchin (2007) estimate the effect of infrastructure on trade by including infrastructure 
linearly in a gravity model. However, quantifying the true impact of infrastructure on trade is difficult, 
mainly because of the interactive nature of various types of infrastructure. Thus, the impact of greater 
phone connectivity depends on the supporting road infrastructure and vice versa. Most importantly, the 
precise way this dependence among infrastructure types occurs is unknown, and no a priori theoretical 
basis for presuming the functional forms for such interactions exists. In our study, therefore, we employed 
a semiparametric variant of the gravity model that allows for unknown nonlinear impacts of infrastructure 
on trade and complementarity among several infrastructure variables. For numerous African countries we 
found that the marginal impacts of infrastructure on trade are significant and lie in the range of estimated 
impacts for most non-African developing countries. Our semiparametric model revealed evidence for 
complementarity across various types of infrastructure. Thus, higher returns from investment in 
infrastructure in Africa or elsewhere can be realized when infrastructures are developed jointly rather than 
in isolation. 
The paper is organized into six sections and an appendix. Section 2 presents methodology based 
on gravity models. Section 3 discusses the data and summary statistics for the econometric analysis. 
Section 4 presents the results and interpretations. Section 5 discusses the semiparametric model and the 
results on the impacts of infrastructure on trade for Africa. In Section 6 we present our conclusions and 
suggest policy implications. The appendix contains tables and figures that present supplementary 
descriptive data and econometric results. 
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2.  METHODOLOGY 
We adopted the model developed by Fontagné et al. (2002), augmented for the role of infrastructure in 
determining trade costs. In the model all goods are differentiated by the place of origin, and each region 
produces only one good; the supply of each good is fixed; and consumers have identical and homothetic 
preferences represented by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. The consumption of 
a good produced in country i by agents in country j  is denoted by  ij c , and the utility functions of the 
agents in country  j are denoted by  j U . 
The agents in country  j  maximize  j U , subject to the budget constraint according to the 
following equation: 
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Those utility functions are subject to the following budget constraint: 
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where σ  is the elasticity of substitution between all goods,  i β  is a distribution parameter, and  ij p  is the 
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is a CES index of the trade costs in exports from i to  j . 
Equation (3) implies that the exports from i to  j  are positively related to the supply capacity of 
i (i’s income  i y ) and the demand capacity of j  ( j ’s income  j y ) and negatively related to trade costs, 
where trade costs include those borne by i in exporting to all other destinations. Thus, trade costs include 
multilateral trade resistance terms, as described in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). This concept 
implies that in a gravity model, important components include not only bilateral trade costs but also the 
costs countries incur from trading with rest of the world. The common practice to proxy for multilateral 
resistance is to include exporter and importer fixed effects in the regressions (see, e.g., Subramanian and 
Wei 2007). Because we were interested in identifying the effect of a dummy variable for African 4 
 
exporters that does not vary over time, we used cross-sectional gravity regressions (for 2001 and 2004 
samples separately and pooled). Even if we had focused on identifying the effect of infrastructure, given 
the two close periods, there was little variation over time to exploit. Thus, we could not identify 
coefficients of infrastructure variables (which are nearly time invariant) in the presence of exporter fixed 
effects. 
The alternative approach that we adopted in this study to control for multilateral resistance terms 
was to include an extensive set of variables that act like a country fixed effects proxy for the price indices. 
Therefore, we included the distance of the exporter from the rest of the world and the distance of the 
importer from the rest of the world as explanatory variables. Similarly, we included the protection faced 
by an exporting country worldwide and the protection imposed by an importing country on the rest of 
world, both relative to bilateral protection as control variables. 
The bilateral trade costs in the presence of infrastructure are given as 
  (1 ) ( ) ij ij i ij tm Id
ρ τ =+ , (5) 
where  ij t is the bilateral import duty applied by country  j  on exports from i. Transportation 
costs are assumed to increase with geographic distance between trading countries  ij d  and vary negatively 
with the level of infrastructure in the exporting country Ii.
1 In the simplest formulation, where 
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In the empirical formulation, extended measures of trade costs can be included; for example, the 
countries being landlocked and the sharing of a common border or language between trading partners. 
The basic linear specification of the gravity equation is given as 
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where  ij X
 is the average value of annual exports from country i to country j (averaged over three years); 
i Y  is the real GDP of country i,  i T  and  j T
 are vectors containing s and s´ multilateral trade resistance 
terms for the exporters and importers; and  ij μ
 is a vector of variables that capture the relationships 
important for trade, like sharing of a common border among others. The dummy variables  i A  and 
j A
capture, respectively, whether the exporter or the importer in a bilateral trading pair falls in Africa. If 
i A  and  j A
 are negative and significant, they capture Africa as an underexporter and underimporter, 
respectively, and vice versa. 
We also estimated other forms of equation (6) to account for zero trade flows. Some studies 
employ a Tobit estimator to examine bilateral zeros (e.g., Subramanian and Tamirisa 2001). Francois and 
Manchin (2007) employ the Heckman method to control for sample selection, but their framework does 
not include an exclusion variable for likelihood of trade. Helpman et al. (2007) use the measures of 
regulation that raise the entry costs as the exclusion variable, but as they point out it is only available for a 
                                                      
1 Ideally there could be importer’s infrastructure as well. When we included importer infrastructure in some specifications, 
the results were identical. The results reported here are with exporter infrastructure only, mainly because in a low-income sample 
the number of observations shrinks considerably while including importing country infrastructure. 5 
 
very restricted set of countries. The strength of the exclusion variable in Helpman et al. comes from its 
theoretical underpinning.
2 
Comparing across various approaches to deal with zero flows (the option to omit the zero flows 
from the sample, various extensions of Tobit estimation, truncated regression, probit regression, and 
substitutions for zero flows), Linders and de Groot (2006) argue that the choice of method should be 
based on both economic and econometric considerations. According to the authors, the sample selection 
model appears to fit both considerations best. Our preferred specification was thus the Heckman 
specification, where we treated zero trade to imply that the countries that have a positive trade compose a 
selected sample. The sample selection model allowed us to account for the unobserved selection criterion 
that leads to positive trade in the current time period. The Heckit estimator combines probit analysis of 
zero trade flows with OLS analysis of trade volumes. 
Most variables that affect whether two countries trade or not are also likely to affect the strength 
of their trading relationship (e.g., geographical distance). Therefore, it is challenging to select variables 
that are highly correlated with a country’s propensity to export and not correlated with the actual levels of 
exports. We used the historical frequency of positive trade between two countries as the exclusion 
variable. Our premise was that the higher the frequency of positive trade in the past, the greater the 
likelihood of two countries having a nonzero trade flow in the current period. Because our trade flow 
variable for the current period is an average over three years, the relationship between historical 
frequency and the likelihood of current trade is likely to be more systematic. Subsequently, we estimated 
variants of equation (6) on a truncated sample that included only the low-income exporter countries and 
low-income importer countries. 
Without any a priori knowledge of the nature of linkage between trade and infrastructure, the 
semiparametric framework that we employed for estimating the impact of infrastructure on trade could be 
meaningful. In the partial linear model, we assumed that the conditional mean has a linear parametric 
component (the standard gravity model variables) and a nonparametric component (i.e., a function of the 
levels of infrastructure). 
The partial linear model is thus specified as 
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and the partial linear model that controls for sample selection is given as 
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where  i IM  denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage of the Heckman regression, 
2 (0, ) ij iid ε σ   , and
'
12 (, ) ii I II = . The two infrastructure variables that we used in the partial linear 
model are phone-line density  1 () i I  and road density 2 () i I . The definition of other variables is same as in 
equation (7). Note that the specification in equation (7) nests the specification in equation (6). By first-
order Taylor series expansion around some value  12 (, ) I I %% we get: 
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12 (, ) j mI I %%
 is the first derivative of  (.) m with respect to the 
th j argument.  12 (, ) ' i I II = %% %
 and 
(.) o include terms that are negligible compared with the leading terms. 
In the partial linear model, we corrected for sample selection bias by including the Mill’s ratio 
linearly in equation (7). Following the standard sample selection model by Heckman (1979), we imposed 
the restriction of joint normality, which explains the linear inclusion. Admittedly, there potentially are 
several more-flexible functional forms we could have considered in this setting. Two obvious ones are 
that (1) the nonparametric component includes the inverse Mill’s ratio along with infrastructure variables, 
and (2) the inverse Mill’s ratio is incorporated as a nonparametric function. Form (1) is a trivial extension 
of the model considered here, but in form (2) we would have had to consider a specific type of additive 
semiparametric model that requires a fundamentally different estimation method. For our analysis we 




12 (, ) j mI I %%is the marginal effect of the 
th j  infrastructure on average annual exports of 
any country i, where the effect has been averaged across all trading partners of that particular country. 
By construction, this marginal effect depends on both infrastructure variables.
3 
The flexible form in the partial linear model also allows us to investigate the existence of 
complementarity among infrastructure variables in a meaningful way. If we observe that 
(1) (1)
12 12 ˆˆ (, ) (, ) jj mI I mI I ≥ %  where  22 I I ≥ % for all values of  1 I  and all pairs  22 (,) I I % , then this would imply 
that  2 I  complements  1 I  globally. However, it is possible that the above condition is satisfied for a subset 
of values of  1 I  and when
2
22 (,) . I IW R ∈⊂ %  In that case we would have local complementarity, which is 
more plausible. Thus, it is possible that when the road density is too low, increasing road density may not 
increase the marginal impact of phone lines on trade, but that beyond a critical level, increases in road 
density positively affect the marginal impact of phone-line density.
4 
                                                      
3 Roughly, if the plots of 
(1) ˆ j m
 against the different infrastructure values are close to horizontal line for all j , then it is 
expected that the true data-generating process is a linear parametric model. More formally, statistical testing of linearity versus a 
partial linear model can be done using a Generalized Likelihood Ratio test as given by Fan et al. (2001). 
4 Specifying the partial linear model as 
' () ij ij i ij PS m Z β ε = ++
, we can estimate the parameters and the nonparametric 
component of this model. One of the established models for obtaining the asymptotic properties of β  was given by Robinson 
(1988), where  () i mZ is treated as a nuisance parameter and thus not of significance to an empirical researcher. In this paper we 
use the profile least-squares-based estimator to obtain the estimates of  (.) m and 
1(.) m respectively. Note that the estimate of 
marginal impact of interest to us is the vector 
1 ˆ ˆ (,) . i mZβ
 The confidence bound for 
ˆ ˆ(,) i mZ β
 and 
1 ˆ ˆ (,) i mZβ
 have been 
obtained based on Carroll et al. (1997). 7 
 
3.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The bilateral export data are obtained from the data set BACI (see Gaulier et al., forthcoming), compiled 
by Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). For the 2001 and 2004 trade 
flows, we averaged the data over the periods, 1998–2001 and 2002–2004, to control for abnormal trade 
flows. The distance between the trading partners and whether or not countries share a common border 
have also been obtained from the CEPII data set. The distance measure here is the bilateral distance 
between the biggest cities of the two trading partners weighted by the share of the city in the country’s 
population. 
We used the data on trade protection from the MAcMap database for the two periods: 2001 and 
2004. We captured the country-specific market access by using the actual bilateral tariffs (taking into 
account the effect of all preferences). This is especially important because our second period of analysis 
(2004) includes the effect of two large-scale preferential arrangements for Africa: the Everything But 
Arms (EBA) Initiative developed by the European Union and the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) established by the United States. We obtained GDP data from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank (2005). The information on the transport and communication infrastructure 
variables was also obtained from the World Development Indicators. We used the transport variable of 
road density, defined as the total road length as a proportion of land area and as a proportion of the total 
population. We measured communication infrastructure in terms of the phone density in the country—
namely, mobile and fixed lines per 1,000 people. For the 2001 sample we used the average of the 
infrastructure data for 1998–2001, and for 2004 we used the average of the infrastructure data for 2001–
2004. 
Trade costs, both natural (like distance) and human-made, were captured as multilateral trade 
resistance terms. The multilateral distance for country i was constructed as a weighted sum of the 
distance from country i to all k  countries weighted by their GDPs. Thus, the distance to a richer country 
gets a higher weight. In that sense the measure captures the remoteness of country i from the world 
economy. 
The import duty we used is a bilateral tariff from the MAcMap database. It includes all 
preferential schemes and regional agreements prevailing in 2001 and 2004 and other measures of bilateral 
protection (specific tariffs, tariff rate quotas and anti-dumping duties). The MAcMap database is a three-
dimensional database that gives for all vectors (importer/exporter/product) AVE of tariffs from 
information on either a bound most-favored-nation (MFN) regime, an applied MFN regime, or a 
preferential regime granted by the importer to the exporter on the product. Tariff information is available 
at the HS6 level for 163 importing countries, 208 exporting countries, and 5,111 products. Aggregation 
can be conducted on one, two, or the three dimensions to estimate the average duty applied to a country’s 
imports, the average duty faced by a country’s exports, the world average duty on a specific product, or 
any combination of those three options. The duty used can either be the preferential duty, the MFN 
applied duty, or the bound duty. The MAcMap weighting scheme aims to avoid the endogeneity bias 
common in this kind of measurements (following the use of a country’s own imports as weights) by using 
as weights the trade structure of a reference group of countries that have levels of GDP per capita close to 
the importers (for more details see Bouët et al. 2008). 
For the AVE of the nontariff barriers, we drew on Kee et al. (2006), which is available only at a 
multilateral level. Because including the AVEs of nontariff barriers reduced our sample size significantly, 
we ran specifications with and without nontariff barrier measures. (Only the results with nontariff barriers 
included have been reported in the paper.) 
The summary statistics for the data are reported in Table 1.
5 The table compares a sample of non-
African exporters with African exporters. 
                                                      
5 The same descriptive statistics for the low-income exporter sample can be requested from the authors. 8 
 
Some important points emerge from these statistics. On average, African exporters, including a 
group of low-income exporters, are farther from the economic centers of the world. Note that a much 
higher proportion of African exporters are landlocked compared with non-African exporters. Africa 
enjoys greater market access relative to the rest of the world in terms of both tariff and nontariff barriers. 
Table 2 present comparisons of various types of infrastructure in Africa and the rest of the world 
globally. Clearly, the levels of infrastructure in both the 2001 and 2004 samples are lower for Africa. 
Road infrastructure in particular is slow to change, and significant changes between the two periods were 
not expected. However, there has been a quantum jump in the phone infrastructure, especially for mobile 
lines, and it has risen significantly across all countries, including African countries. 9 
 









  African countries 
(1,965 
observations) 
  Non-African 
countries (3,245 
observations) 
  African countries 
(1,080 
observations) 
Mean   Std. 
dev. 
 Mean  Std. 
dev.  
 Mean   Std. 
dev.  
 Mean    Std. 
dev.  
Log  trade    7.23  4.46    4.54 3.68   8.38  3.61  5.78 3.37 
Log GDP exporter  24.24  2.32    22.35  1.21    24.45  1.99    22.66  0.96 
Log GDP importer  24.14  1.89    24.14  1.90    24.36  1.71    24.45  1.79 
Log  bilateral  distance  8.77  0.80    8.69 0.66   8.64  0.87  8.64 0.64 
Log distance exporter from the world   2.05  0.23    2.15  0.11    2.03  0.22    2.15  0.12 
Log distance importer from the world  2.10  0.22    2.10  0.22    2.10  0.23    2.09  0.22 
Contiguity  0.02  0.14    0.02 0.16   0.03  0.18  0.03 0.17 
Common  language    0.12  0.32    0.19 0.39   0.11  0.31  0.17 0.38 
Colony 0.01  0.11    0.002  0.04    0.005  0.07    0.001  0.06 
Landlocked  exporter    0.13  0.34    0.35 0.47   0.14  0.34  0.28 0.45 
Landlocked  importer    0.18  0.38    0.18 0.38   0.12  0.33  0.10 0.30 
Log bilateral tariff  -2.49  1.34    -2.84  1.85    -2.50  1.32    -3.05  2.06 
Log of NTB protection (data for 2004)  -2.97  1.02    -2.99  1.02    -2.90  0.97    -2.90  0.96 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics on infrastructure (full sample) 
                       2001                           2004 
  Non-African 
countries 
 African  countries    Non-African 
countries 
 African  countries 
Variable   Mean   Std. dev.    Mean  Std dev.    Mean   Std. 
dev.  
 Mean  Std  dev. 
Road length per unit of population   0.007  0.008    0.003  0.005    0.007  0.007    0.004  0.007 
Road length per unit of land area  0.84  1.33    0.13  0.16    0.75  1.31    0.14  0.17 
Percent of road paved   58.87  32.53    27.94 24.55    54.65  32.81  26.60  24.15 
Phone lines per 1,000 people  79.75  116.65    4.10  11.42    317.02  291.33    31.62  54.91 
Main lines per 1,000 people   229.11  227.31    28.31  49.08    192.44  212.82    34.68  64.21 10 
 
An important concern in the existing studies that estimate trade flows relates to the error in 
measuring market access. The problem of measurement error in market access is complex owing to 
different distributions of protection based on the different breadths of included measures of protection. 
Figure 1 compares the distribution of protection faced by 207 countries in 2001 in the full sample when 
only the AVEs of tariffs and specific tariffs were included. The fact that the distribution of applied 
protection changes significantly depending on the breadth of included measures of protection points to 
potential measurement errors when using incomplete data. 










Ad valorem tariff Total tariff
        
Source: Author’s calculations using the MAcMap HS6 database. 
By calculating the average duties faced by exports of various continents,
6 we concluded that 
Africa’s access to foreign markets is on average better than that of America, Asia, or the Pacific. 
However, wide disparities exist among African countries: 21 African countries have better access than the 
world average, and 11 of those countries face an average duty on exports that is less than 2 percent: 
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Central Africa, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Lesotho, Liberia, and Libya. In contrast, 32 countries have less favorable access to foreign 
markets compared with the world average, 13 of which face an average duty on exports that is greater 
than 10 percent, and Malawi faces a stiff average tariff of 23.1 percent on its exports. 
This contrasting picture of African access to foreign markets results from two effects. First, the 
structure of world protection is unequally distributed among sectors and across importers. Countries that 
are highly specialized in certain agricultural products—like meat, milk, sugar, or some cereals—or that 
export to protectionist countries get penalized. We call that a composition effect. However, more 
preferential access to some countries than to the rest of the world decreases the average duty on exports. 
That is known as the true preference margin effect. If the composition effect is positive, even without 
preferences, a country benefits from a tariff lower than the world average. A positive true preference 
margin implies that the country benefits from preferences relative to the rest of the world, and conversely 
for a negative true preference margin. 
                                                      
6 Results are available on request from the authors. 11 
 
Table 3.  Apparent margin and its decomposition for African countries, 2004  
Country/zone Applied  duty  Apparent  margin  Composition effect  True preference margin 
World 4.5      
Africa 4.2  0.3  0.6  -0.3 
America 5.3  -0.8  -0.8  0.1 
Asia 5.1  -0.6  0.5  -1.1 
Europe 3.6  0.9  0.1 0.8 
Pacific 10.6  -6.0  -5.3 -0.7 
LDC 4.7  -0.1  -1.2  1.1 
MIC 5.1  -0.6  0.1  -0.7 
OECD 4.1  0.4  0.0  0.4 
Chad 1.3  3.3  4.0  -0.8 
Congo DR  1.2  3.3  4.5  -1.2 
Malawi 23.1  -18.6  -23.1  4.5 
Togo 14.9  -10.4  -10.8  0.5 
Source: Author’s calculations using the MAcMap HS6 database. 
Note: Congo DR = Democratic Republic of the Congo; LDC = least developed countries; MIC = middle-income countries; 
OECD = countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Table 3 presents this decomposition for country groups and selected African countries. Formally, 
the extent of trade preferences given to an exporting country i (or a geographic zone) is defined by 
country i's apparent margin (AMi), which is the difference between the applied duty faced by the world's 
exports (ADW) and the applied duty faced by country i’s exports (ADi). These two averages take into 
account all preferential regimes, but the MAcMap database allows for calculating the same average on the 
basis of only most-favored-nation duties (i.e., without taking into account preferential schemes and 
regional agreements). These averages are called MFNDW and MFNDi. 
Thus, the apparent margin can be rewritten as 
AMi = ADW  – ADi = ADW  - MFNDW + MFNDW - MFNDi + MFNDi – ADi 
 =  (MFNDW – MFNDi)+((MFNDi – ADi) – (MFNDW  – ADW)) 
The first term in parentheses compares average market accesses for the world and for country i 
without taking into account preferences; it captures the composition effect: if MFNDW is greater than 
MFNDi, that cannot be attributed to preferences given to country i but to the composition of exports. The 
second term captures the difference between the preferential margin given to country i (MFNDi – ADi) 
and the preferential margin given to the world (MFNDW – ADW). That is the true preference margin (see 
Bouët et al. 2005 for more details and more comprehensive results). 
Table 3 shows that if African countries benefit from an average duty on exports that is 0.3 percent 
lower than that of the rest of the world, the reason is a composition effect that is favorable (0.6 percent). 
Specializations in products that are not highly taxed throughout the world (oil, gas, and mineral products) 
have a positive impact on market access in those countries. The average statistic hides significant 
heterogeneity across countries; exports from Malawi, Swaziland, Togo, Benin, and Mauritius are 
penalized because of specialization in highly protected products, and preferences compensate only 
partially (in absolute value, true preference margins are less than the composition effect). On the other 
hand, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Libya, and Lesotho have a positive composition 
effect. For Africa as a whole, the true preference margin is negative; that is, Africa receives less 
preference than the rest of the world on average. 12 
 
4.  RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
Table 4 presents the results from our preferred Heckman specification for 2001 and for the full sample. In 
Table 5 the sample includes only low-income countries. Results for 2004 are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
In Tables 4 through 7 the first and third columns present the results of the gravity model estimation in a 
sample selection framework, and the second and fourth columns present the results of the first-stage 
estimation of the likelihood of countries trading with each other. The infrastructure variables included in 
Table 4 are road length as a proportion of population and phones per 1,000 people in the exporting 
country. Results are robust to alternate measures of transport and communication infrastructure—namely, 
roads as a percentage of land area, percentage of roads that are paved, and fixed phone lines per 1,000 
people (as well as total fixed and mobile lines per 1,000 people). Similarly, results are robust to inclusion 
of the importing-country infrastructure. Similarly to the exporting-country infrastructure, the importing-
country infrastructure variables contribute to the multilateral resistance terms. The same specifications 
have been run for the pooled sample (not reported here). 
Table 4.  Heckman regression, 2001 (full sample) 
 
Coefficient 
Not including infrastructure    Including infrastructure 
Logtrade  Likelihood     Logtrade   Likelihood  
Exporter’s GDP  1.034***  0.326***  1.013***  0.338*** 
 (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.022) 
Importer’s GDP  0.896***  0.270***  0.900***  0.280*** 
 (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.021) 
Bilateral distance  -1.325***  -0.258***  -1.330***  -0.283*** 
 (0.037)  (0.053)  (0.036)  (0.054) 
Distance of exporter from 
world 
0.630*** -0.525***  0.725***  -0.391*** 
 (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.15) 
Distance of importer from 
world 
0.438*** -0.272**  0.437*** -0.244* 
 (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.13) 
Bilateral tariff  0.0684  0.120**  0.0855*  0.143*** 
 (0.047)  (0.051)  (0.047)  (0.052) 
Relative import protection  0.0397  0.0970**  0.0327  0.0896** 
 (0.035)  (0.045)  (0.034)  (0.045) 
Relative export protection  -0.117***  -0.185***  -0.135***  -0.207*** 
 (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.034) 
NTBs of importer  -0.0676***  -0.0460*  -0.0686***  -0.0502** 
 (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.025) 
Landlocked exporter  -0.00711  -0.0803  -0.0178  -0.0681 
 (0.059)  (0.056)  (0.059)  (0.058) 
Landlocked importer  -0.446***  -0.193***  -0.446***  -0.211*** 
 (0.062)  (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.063) 
Contiguity 1.037***  0.0717  1.070***  0.135 
 (0.14)  (0.34)  (0.14)  (0.35) 13 
 
Table 4. Continued 
 
Coefficient 
Not including infrastructure    Including infrastructure 
Logtrade  Likelihood     Logtrade   Likelihood  
Common language  0.694***  0.242***  0.682***  0.214*** 
 (0.065)  (0.082)  (0.065)  (0.082) 
Colonial relation  0.698***  4.617  0.709***  4.621 
 (0.19)  (0)  (0.19)  (0) 
African exporter’s dummy  -0.272***  -0.0647  -0.0711  0.135** 
 (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.069)  (0.067) 
Historical frequency of trade    2.366***    2.303*** 
   (0.092)    (0.092) 
Constant -29.30***  -9.583***  -28.88***  -9.519*** 
 (0.61)  (0.88)  (0.62)  (0.89) 
Exporter’s phone density      0.0565***  0.0370* 
     (0.016)  (0.020) 
Exporter’s road density      0.0651***  0.138*** 
     (0.025)  (0.033) 
Observations 8563  8563  8563  8563 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
Table 5.  Heckman regression, 2001 (low-income exporter sample) 
 
Coefficient 
Not including infrastructure    Including infrastructure 
Logtrade   Likelihood     Logtrade   Likelihood  
Exporter’s GDP  0.819***  0.302***  0.889***  0.353*** 
 (0.054)  (0.046)  (0.056)  (0.050) 
Importer’s GDP  0.661***  0.267***  0.682***  0.274*** 
 (0.043)  (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.035) 
Bilateral  distance  -0.929*** -0.131  -1.022*** -0.162* 
 (0.12)  (0.089)  (0.12)  (0.090) 
Distance of exporter from world  1.176*  0.0367  0.971  0.343 
 (0.62)  (0.43)  (0.62)  (0.45) 
Distance of importer from world  -0.223  -0.654***  -0.201  -0.637*** 
 (0.28)  (0.20)  (0.28)  (0.20) 
Bilateral  tariff  0.346*** 0.208**  0.448*** 0.195** 
 (0.12)  (0.089)  (0.12)  (0.091) 
Relative import protection  -0.0718  -0.0391  -0.120  -0.0569 
 (0.096)  (0.076)  (0.093)  (0.076) 
Relative export protection  -0.326***  -0.173***  -0.413***  -0.153*** 
 (0.088)  (0.057)  (0.088)  (0.059) 
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Table 5. Continued 
 
Coefficient 
Not including infrastructure    Including infrastructure 
Logtrade   Likelihood     Logtrade   Likelihood  
NTBs of importer  -0.0676  -0.0572  -0.0828  -0.0607 
 (0.060)  (0.042)  (0.058)  (0.042) 
Landlocked exporter  0.0201  -0.117  -0.0675  -0.0290 
 (0.12)  (0.083)  (0.13)  (0.098) 
Landlocked importer  0.205  -0.155  0.130  -0.168 
 (0.17)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.11) 
Contiguity  1.357*** 0.175  1.329*** 0.206 
 (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.38)  (0.39) 
Common  language  0.842*** 0.172  0.722*** 0.159 
 (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.13) 
Colonial relation  2.354*  3.787  2.663**  3.791 
 (1.22)  (0)  (1.18)  (0) 
African exporter’s dummy  -0.148  0.240**  0.152  0.278*** 
 (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.16)  (0.11) 
Historical frequency of trade    2.154***    2.119*** 
   (0.15)    (0.15) 
Constant -21.23***  -10.56***  -19.16***  -12.27*** 
 (2.29)  (1.65)  (2.41)  (1.79) 
Exporter’s phone density      0.0714  0.225** 
     (0.11)  (0.088) 
Exporter’s road density      0.474***  0.0334 
     (0.076)  (0.054) 
Observations 1883  1883  1883  1883 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
Table 6.  Heckman regression, 2004 (full sample) 
 
Coefficient 
Not including infrastructure    Including infrastructure 
Logtrade   Likelihood     Logtrade   Likelihood  
Exporter’s GDP  1.091***  0.228***  1.096***  0.305*** 
  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.034)  (0.045) 
Importer’s GDP  0.798***  0.281***  0.810***  0.373*** 
  (0.061)  (0.054)  (0.041)  (0.038) 
Bilateral distance  -1.144***  -0.285**  -1.152***  -0.274*** 
  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.091)  (0.099) 
Distance of exporter from world  1.044**  -0.569  1.692***  -0.751** 
  (0.48)  (0.39)  (0.33)  (0.33) 
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Table 6. Continued  
 
Coefficient 
Not including infrastructure    Including infrastructure 
Logtrade   Likelihood     Logtrade   Likelihood  
Distance of importer from 
world 
0.140  -0.770***  -0.0612  -0.381* 
  (0.42)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.23) 
Bilateral tariff  -0.691***  0.411***  -0.446***  0.301*** 
  (0.20)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.11) 
Relative import protection  0.351***  -0.162  0.269***  -0.00415 
  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.090)  (0.080) 
Relative export protection  0.360**  -0.180*  0.184*  -0.301*** 
  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.088) 
NTBs of importer  -0.00272  -0.162**  -0.0782   
  (0.090)  (0.064)  (0.058)   
Landlocked exporter  -0.545**  -0.238*  0.00153  -0.355*** 
  (0.22)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.13) 
Landlocked importer  -0.675***  -0.525***  -0.789***  -0.355*** 
  (0.26)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.12) 
Contiguity  1.037**  4.458  1.027***  4.928 
  (0.52)  (0)  (0.35)  (0) 
Common language  0.917***  0.0847  0.828***  0.102 
  (0.26)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
Colonial relation  0.342  2.328  0.194  2.773 
  (1.10)  (0)  (0.74)  (0) 
African exporter’s dummy  -0.686***  -0.179  0.211  -0.127 
  (0.22)  (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.13) 
Historical frequency of trade    2.558***    2.454*** 
   (0.24)    (0.19) 
Constant  6.128***  5.162***  3.948***  5.482*** 
  (1.56)  (1.29)  (1.15)  (1.13) 
Exporter’s phone density     0.386***  -0.0904** 
     (0.050)  (0.045) 
Exporter’s road density     0.0837  0.200*** 
     (0.066)  (0.067) 
Observations  3974  3974  3974  3974 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 16 
 
Table 7.  Heckman regression, 2004 (low-income exporter sample) 
 
Coefficient 
Not including infrastructure    Including infrastructure 
Logtrade   Likelihood     Logtrade   Likelihood  
Exporter’s GDP  1.089***  0.290***  0.971***  0.0824 
 (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Importer’s GDP  0.574***  0.137***  0.619***  0.180*** 
 (0.095)  (0.049)  (0.081)  (0.051) 
Bilateral distance  -0.895***  -0.167  -1.050***  -0.215 
 (0.27)  (0.14)  (0.23)  (0.15) 
Distance of exporter from world  1.733  -1.496*  1.532  -2.221** 
 (1.96)  (0.87)  (1.76)  (0.94) 
Distance of importer from world  -0.361  -0.786**  -0.243  -0.775** 
 (0.75)  (0.32)  (0.63)  (0.32) 
Bilateral tariff  -0.0251  0.117  0.268  0.189 
 (0.33)  (0.15)  (0.30)  (0.16) 
Relative import protection  0.119  -0.0203  0.0565  -0.0274 
 (0.19)  (0.087)  (0.16)  (0.089) 
Relative export protection  -0.0560  -0.108  -0.339  -0.192 
 (0.28)  (0.13)  (0.26)  (0.14) 
Landlocked exporter  -0.0885  -0.00545  -1.097*  -0.885*** 
 (0.33)  (0.13)  (0.60)  (0.28) 
Landlocked importer  -0.286  0.168  -0.340  0.185 
 (0.43)  (0.19)  (0.36)  (0.19) 
Contiguity 1.297  4.623  1.241  4.684 
 (1.20)  (0)  (1.02)  (0) 
Common language  0.577  0.276  0.460  0.416* 
 (0.43)  (0.21)  (0.37)  (0.22) 
Colonial relation  1.628  2.942  1.750  3.197 
 (1.80)  (0)  (1.53)  (0) 
African exporter’s dummy  -0.0545 -0.358*  0.0609 -0.267 
 (0.41)  (0.20)  (0.35)  (0.21) 
Historical frequency of trade    2.211***    2.061*** 
    (0.27)    (0.28) 
Constant -27.34***  -2.367  -16.20**  7.069* 
 (5.57)  (3.18)  (6.99)  (4.11) 
Exporter’s phone density     -0.473*  -0.440*** 
     (0.25)  (0.12) 
Exporter’s road density     0.923***  0.342** 
     (0.27)  (0.14) 
Observations  1222  1222  1222  1222 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 17 
 
In the Heckman specifications, our exclusion variable is the historical frequency of positive trade, 
as previously discussed. From the probit regression of whether or not the trading partners trade in either 
of the three years over which the average level of trade is taken, the historical frequency is a very strong 
predictor of trading partners’ propensity to trade. 
The dummy variable for African exporters is negative and significant in the full sample, implying 
that if the comparator set of countries is the rest of the world, Africa is an underexporter. However, if the 
comparator is the rest of the world within the low-income group, then African low-income exporters do 
not underexport.
7 Note that given the global distribution of incomes, the low-income exporter sample 
includes a disproportionately large number of African countries. More importantly, in the presence of 
exporting-country infrastructure, the undertrading effect for Africa is lower. That undertrading effect 
without inclusion of infrastructure is robust to various specifications of the gravity model. The 
undertrading effect does get reduced with inclusion of infrastructure, and in some specifications it 
vanishes altogether. 
To check for the robustness of the gravity model results on the underexporting by Africa, we ran 
log linear specifications (with zero trade excluded) and Tobit specifications, treating observed zero trade 
as a corner solution. Tables A.1 through A.5 in the appendix present the results from the log linear and 
Tobit specifications of the gravity model. The status of Africa as an undertrader in the global sample and 
not an undertrader in the low-income sample holds true in all these specifications. Although not 
presented, the results hold for a pooled sample for 2001 and 2004 and also for the inclusion of the 
importing-country infrastructure variables. 
The results provide generally consistent evidence that trade-related infrastructure (transport and 
communication) is a significant determinant of trade flows and, accounting for infrastructure (in all the 
specifications), consistently reduces the size of the African export dummy variable. Thus, infrastructure 
(or its correlates, such as institutions) can be considered among the factors that account for at least part of 
undertrading by Africa. That conclusion follows from levels of trade-related infrastructure being on 
average lower in Africa than in the rest of the world and trade-facilitating infrastructure having a 
significant effect on trade flows. 
 
                                                      
7 Although the results are not presented here, our analysis revealed that Africa is not an underimporter. Also not presented 
here are the results indicating that Africa appeared to be an underexporter when we controlled for importing-country 
infrastructure. 18 
 
5.  ROLE OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN AFRICAN TRADE 
Having established that infrastructure is a potential factor in Africa’s undertrading, we estimated its 
impact on trade using a partial linear specification of the gravity model, as given in equation (7a), which 
allows for all possible interactions across various types of infrastructure. We considered two 
infrastructure variables—road and phone-line density—because interactions between them are easy to 
conceive. The data on infrastructure for 2001 correspond to the averages of 1998 and 1999, and for 2004 
they correspond to the averages of 2001 and 2002. The marginal impacts using the 2001 and 2004 
samples separately were similar and are not reported here. 
The impact of increments in phone-line and road density on trade for the countries in the sample 
with pooled data for 2001 and 2004 range from 0.0 to 0.88, respectively (for most countries the impact is 
evaluated at less than 0.4) and from 0.0 to 0.7. Although phone-line density increased drastically in all 
countries between 1998 and 2002, only small changes in road density (as a fraction of land area or of 
population) have occurred between those two periods. Thus, when we estimated the marginal impacts of 
phone lines for 2001 and 2004 separately, the impacts were significantly higher in 2004. We interpreted 
that result as possibly capturing the role of network effects. Network effects imply that starting from a 
higher base, the same percentage increase in phone-line density is much more effective because a large 
set of phone users already exists. 
Among the set of African countries where the estimated marginal impacts of phone density on 
trade are statistically significant, the effects for several countries were also quantitatively significant. 
Thus, for countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Mauritius, a 1 percent increase 
in phone density is likely to increase exports by more than 0.35 percent. In several other African countries 
(e.g., Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Malawi and Tanzania), increases in exports greater than 0.1 percent from an 
increase in phone density exceeding 1 percent have been observed. 
Broadly, African countries concentrated in a low-income distribution are similar in the estimated 
marginal impacts of phone density on trade with other low-income countries. 
Similarly, we estimated statistically significant and quantitatively important impacts of road 
density on trade for several African countries. The highest estimated marginal impact of road density for 
African countries is nearly 0.7 percent in case of Sudan. Also, an impact on trade exceeding an impact on 
trade exceeding 0.1 percent from a 1 percent increase in road density has been observed in several African 
countries, including Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Gambia, and Madagascar. Figures A.1 through A.4 in the 
appendix present the estimated marginal impacts of phone and road infrastructure on trade (the top 20) for 
African and non-African countries. In the figures the estimated marginal impacts of phone-line and road 
density on trade flows are averaged across all bilateral trading pairs. 
Some important points emerge from these marginal impacts. Among the set of African countries 
where the estimated marginal impacts of phone density on trade are significant, several countries are 
extremely poor—for example, Mali, Rwanda, and Burundi. Thus, for countries like the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Mauritius, a 1 percent increase in phone density is likely to increase 
exports by more than 0.35 percent. In several other African countries, an increase in exports greater than 
0.1 percent results from 1 percent increase in phone density has been observed—for example, in Sierra 
Leone, Nigeria, Malawi, and Tanzania. 
Broadly, African countries concentrated in a low-income distribution are similar to other low-
income countries in terms of the estimated marginal impacts of phone density on trade. Similarly, we 
estimated statistically significant and quantitatively important impacts on trade for several African 
countries in terms of road density. The highest estimated marginal impact of road density for African 
countries is nearly 0.7 percent in the case of Sudan. Also, an impact on trade greater than 0.1 percent from 
a 1 percent increase in road density has been observed in several African countries, such as Guinea-
Bissau, Mauritania, Gambia, and Madagascar. 
How do these estimated marginal impacts vary with country characteristics? Table 8 presents the 
average of the estimated marginal impacts across several country group characteristics. It includes the 19 
 
average for the world excluding Africa and for Africa alone. The average estimated marginal impact of 
road density in Africa is fairly constant across all groupings. Among low-income countries, the impacts 
were higher in Africa than elsewhere. The impacts varied significantly with the composition of exports. 
The impact of greater phone density unambiguously increases as the share of high technology or service 
exports increases in Africa. 
Based on the cost of doing trade estimated by the World Bank (2007), Table 8 classifies the 
countries as those with low or high costs of trade (below or above the median in terms of document 
requirements, time to export, and costs to export, respectively). Importantly, in countries in Africa and 
elsewhere, wherever the existing costs of trade are higher, the marginal impacts of phone density are 
higher. Indeed, one cause of greater costs of trade or greater time taken to trade is lower levels of 
infrastructure. 
Table 8.  Marginal impacts and country characteristics 
 
Characteristics 
Average marginal impact of 
road by category 
  Average marginal impact of 
phone by category 
  Excluding 
Africa (rest 
of the world) 
Africa only    Excluding 
Africa (rest 
of the world) 
Africa only 
All exporting countries   0.22  0.12  0.10  0.14 
Landlocked exporter  0.11  0.32  0.12  0.16 
Not landlocked exporter  0.13  0.18  0.15  0.09 
Low-income exporter  0.26  0.28  0.06  0.11 
Middle-income exporter  0.05  0.07  0.15  0.07 
High-income exporter  0.05  -  0.30  - 
Share of high-technology exports (greater than 25%)  0.13  0.22  0.13  0.11 
Share of high-technology exports (less than 25%)  0.07  0.24  0.18  0.07 
Ratio of service to merchandise exports (greater than 
median) 
0.13 0.22  0.13 0.11 
Ratio of service to merchandise exports (less than 
median) 
0.07 0.07  0.24 0.20 
Levels of other infrastructure and institutions (not incorporated in the model)* 
High aircraft departure  0.11  0.22  0.16  0.11 
Low aircraft departure   0.11  0.25  0.09  0.10 
High electricity  0.11  0.22  0.16  0.11 
Low electricity   0.20  0.24  0.07  .0.07 
High icrge index (high index for institutional quality)  0.11  0.23  0.15  0.70 
Low icrge index (low index for institutional quality)  0.18  0.27  0.09  0.10 
High Internet usage  0.16  0.21  0.11  0.11 
Low internet usage  0.19  0.25  0.06  0.14 
High document requirements   0.13  0.24  0.13  0.10 
Low document requirements   0.07  0.12  0.22  0.07 
High time to export  0.13  0.24  0.13  0.11 
Low time to export  0.06  0.08  0.23  0.06 
High exports cost   0.13  0.23  0.13  0.11 
Low exports cost  0.08  0.18  0.20  0.07 
Source: Author’s calculations based on estimations from World Bank (2007).  
* High = greater than median; low = smaller than median.20 
 
Given the specification of the partial linear gravity model, the marginal impact of either of the 
two infrastructures depends on the level of the other infrastructure, as previously discussed. The estimated 
marginal impact of roads or phone lines depends on the other infrastructure (e.g., the marginal impact of 
phone lines depends on the density of phone lines as well as the density of roads). Establishing 
complementarities across types of infrastructure is equivalent to addressing the following question: 
Independent of the country considered, is the marginal impact of one infrastructure on the average level 
of exports significantly higher when the level of the other infrastructure is higher? 
Thus, for complementarity between phone and road connectivity, this counterfactual exercise 
required assigning same level of road density to all countries in the sample and obtaining different 
marginal impacts of phone lines for different phone-line densities. We call this a phone-line density plot 
(conditional on a given level of road density). A change in the level of road density could lead to a 
potential shift in the phone-line density plot. As explained in the previous section, local or global 
complementarity can be observed, depending on the resultant shift. 
Figure 2 presents the results of a counterfactual exercise in which all countries in the sample are 
made to have the same road density. We consider four levels of road densities: the 25
th, 50
th, 75
th , and 
90
th percentiles obtained from the empirical distribution of observed road density. In the figure, different 
lines are associated with the four different levels of road density. As expected, we witnessed local 
complementarity, which occurs when the log of phone-line density is between 1 and 4.5, when the phone-
line density plot shifts upward. Complementarity is not observed in lower and upper extreme values for 
phone-line density. 

































When the phone-line density is too low, it is expected that increasing road density will not affect 
the marginal impact of phone-line density because of the absence of a critical level of phone-line density. 
When the phone-line density is very high, the potential of phone-line penetration is already realized, and 
an increase in road density does not seem to have an effect. This idea of thresholds in the impact of 
infrastructure has increasingly been recognized through the use of threshold regressions in estimating the 
augmented production functions (see, e.g., Hurlin 2006). Our results support the idea of thresholds, albeit 
in terms of impact on trade and estimated in a way that allows for an unrestricted number of thresholds 
compared with the threshold regressions framework. 
Even though it is natural to expect complementarity, a relationship like that has formally not been 
established in the trade literature. Note that this relationship does not correspond to a positive relationship 
between road density and the marginal impact of phone lines. Because different countries trade in 
different products and have different levels of determinants of trade, a monotonic relationship is difficult 
to predict across a cross section of exporting countries. Thus, complementarity implies that the higher the 
gain from investment in infrastructure (in terms of its impact on trade) for any country, the higher the 
level of infrastructure to which it is complementary. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our assessment of market access for Africa shows that on average Africa enjoys good access to foreign 
markets. However, there are significant variations within Africa with some low-income countries like 
Malawi facing worse market access relative to the rest of the world. Trade preferences can improve 
market access by lowering the duties faced on African exports. Based on the types of products on which 
preferences are granted and the countries that grant preferences to Africa, we found that the current true 
preference margin for Africa is negative. Thus, greater market access will help African exports, but again 
the effects are likely to be disparate across countries. 
The evidence, however, suggests that even if preferences help raise the level of exports, Africa 
will likely continue to trade less than it should. The low quality of trade-related infrastructure in Africa 
implies that interventions that improve the level and quality of infrastructure can yield high returns in 
terms of mitigating the undertrading effect. However, the impact of infrastructure on trade exhibits 
significant complementarities. Thus, policy interventions that develop infrastructure in a piecemeal 
fashion in Africa are likely to yield much lower returns than those that develop infrastructure 
comprehensively. 
Further, the significant impacts of infrastructure on trade have important policy implications in 
light of the aid-for-trade policy agenda that has surfaced in the Doha Round. Essentially, the principle 
behind the aid-for-trade agenda is the realization that observed low trading by countries with already good 
market access (in Africa and elsewhere but mainly in low-income countries) implies that market access is 
not the only reason for the declining trade performance of certain countries. Our finding that 
infrastructure has important and significant effects on trade basically supports the premise behind the aid-
for-trade agenda. 
Aid for trade has concurred with an increasing skepticism on the effectiveness of foreign aid 
(Rajan and Subramanian 2005; Easterly 2006). Trade and aid have often been viewed as substitutes for 
one another, but recently the aid-for-trade policy has gained prominence for its view that aid and trade are 
complements. Proponents of the policy argue that the capacity of developing countries to take advantage 
of any market access gains in the Doha Round is currently hampered by several supply-side bottlenecks 
and costs, administrative constraints, and poor institutions. Thus, aid for trade refers to additional aid 
devoted to tackling the trade-related constraints and adjustment costs in developing countries (Evenett 
2005). Development of infrastructure in this regard is important for Africa and supports the aid-for-trade 
agenda. 
In several African countries where good market access already exists, enhancing preferential 
access is likely to yield insignificant gains. In many of the same countries (e.g., Uganda), the high impacts 
of infrastructure imply that the gains in terms of enhanced trade might accrue through improvements in 
domestic factors, most noticeably in trade-related infrastructure. 23 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A.1.  Average duties faced on exports 
Country Global  Agricultural  Industry  Primary  
(not agricultural) 
Algeria  1.4%  12.7% 1.6% 1.1% 
Angola  1.5% 6.4% 0.9% 1.5% 
Benin  13.2%  23.7% 8.6% 4.7% 
Botswana  1.9%  53.5% 0.9% 5.5% 
Burkina  Faso  11.0%  30.4% 5.8% 8.7% 
Burundi  6.0%  11.2% 2.7% 3.3% 
Cameroon  4.2%  10.7% 4.3% 1.3% 
Central  Africa  Republic 1.6% 8.3% 1.4% 1.0% 
Chad  1.3%  16.9% 2.0% 1.0% 
Congo  2.9%  39.7% 2.7% 1.9% 
Congo  DR  1.2%  17.3% 0.7% 1.1% 
Côte  d'ivoire  5.7% 6.2% 5.7% 1.8% 
Djibouti 11.0%  13.0%  9.8%  10.8% 
Egypt  5.4%  21.5% 3.9% 1.4% 
Equatorial  Guinea  1.4% 2.2% 1.2% 1.4% 
Eritrea  6.6%  14.6% 4.3% 2.4% 
Ethiopia 9.1%  10.4%  3.6%  18.4% 
Gabon  1.9%  24.6% 2.7% 1.4% 
Ghana  4.8% 5.1% 4.8% 3.1% 
Guinea-bissau  14.1%  22.9% 8.6% 1.6% 
Kenya 12.5%  14.6%  10.6%  6.4% 
Lesotho  1.3% 9.2% 1.3% 2.5% 
Libya  1.3%  11.9% 3.4% 0.9% 
Madagascar  3.5% 4.8% 2.4% 2.6% 
Malawi  23.1%  27.4% 8.5% 6.1% 
Mali  4.5% 9.0% 4.2% 3.3% 
Mauritania  5.3% 9.7% 5.0% 0.7% 
Mauritius  13.0%  40.7% 4.0% 3.2% 
Morocco  5.0% 9.8% 4.0% 1.6% 
Mozambique  5.1%  22.5% 1.8% 3.9% 
Namibia  9.2%  20.9% 3.9% 1.8% 
Niger  4.8%  17.8% 2.7% 0.5% 
Nigeria  2.4% 4.5% 2.4% 2.4% 
Rwanda  6.7%  17.6% 6.7% 2.4% 
Senegal 10.1%  11.1%  10.4%  6.0% 
Seychelles  5.3% 5.8% 4.7% 2.8% 
South  Africa  5.4%  17.6% 4.6% 1.5% 
Sudan  4.4%  16.5% 5.0% 1.5% 
Swaziland  19.0%  54.4% 8.8% 2.9% 24 
 
Table A.1.  Continued  
Country Global  Agricultural  Industry  Primary   
(not agricultural) 
Tanzania  9.5%  18.9% 4.9% 2.1% 
Togo 14.9%  17.1%  15.6%  3.3% 
Tunisia  5.2%  19.4% 4.2% 0.9% 
Uganda  8.6%  10.1% 6.7% 1.7% 
Zambia  6.6%  24.5% 3.9% 3.0% 
Zimbabwe  11.3%  23.7% 5.0% 4.8% 
World  4.5%  16.0% 3.7% 1.5% 
LDC  4.7%  15.3% 4.3% 2.0% 
MIC  5.1%  20.0% 4.6% 1.5% 
OECD  4.1%  14.0% 3.3% 1.3% 
Africa  4.2%  15.2% 3.9% 1.6% 
America  5.3%  18.5% 3.7% 1.2% 
Asia  5.1%  19.3% 4.9% 1.6% 
Europe  3.6%  12.1% 2.9% 1.2% 
Pacific  10.6%  32.1% 4.3% 2.5% 
Source: MAcMap HS6-2004 and author’s calculation. 25 
 
Table A.2.  Log linear specification of the gravity model, 2001 













Exporter’s GDP  1.118*** 1.085*** 1.059***  1.127***
  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.040)  (0.042) 
Importer’s GDP  0.962***  0.963***  0.887***  0.889*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
Bilateral distance  -1.430***  -1.429***  -1.244***  -1.321*** 
  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
Distance of exporter from  0.604***  0.713***  1.658***  1.448** 
  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.63)  (0.62) 
Distance of importer from  0.476***  0.472***  -0.458  -0.401 
  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.29)  (0.28) 
Bilateral tariff  0.0953*  0.112**  0.511***  0.603*** 
  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
Relative import protection  0.0467  0.0374  -0.123  -0.179** 
  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.091)  (0.090) 
Relative export protection  -0.146***  -0.163***  -0.464***  -0.541*** 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.083)  (0.085) 
NTBs of importer  -0.0716***  -0.0728***  -0.0633  -0.0807 
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.058)  (0.056) 
Landlocked exporter  -0.0469  -0.0550  -0.0889  -0.142 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
Landlocked importer  -0.500***  -0.499***  0.118  0.0454 
  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Contiguity  1.021***  1.069***  1.504***  1.468*** 
  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.39)  (0.35) 
Common language  0.747***  0.727***  0.990***  0.838*** 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Colonial relation  0.588***  0.609***  2.345**  2.732*** 
  (0.14)  (0.14)  (1.08)  (0.88) 
African exporter’s dummy  -0.285***  -0.0394  0.121  0.439*** 
  (0.067)  (0.075)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Exporter’s phone density    0.0763***    0.162 
   (0.016)    (0.10) 
Exporter’s road density    0.0663***    0.545*** 
   (0.025)    (0.072) 
Constant  -32.17***  -31.51***  -30.28***  -27.52*** 
  (0.55)  (0.57)  (1.99)  (2.13) 
Observations  6998  6998  1260  1260 
R-squared  0.74  0.74  0.54  0.57 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 26 
 
Table A.3.  Tobit model, 2001  









Exporter’s GDP  1.460*** 1.386*** 1.688***  1.810***
  (0.014) (0.017)  (0.068) (0.070) 
Importer’s  GDP  1.244*** 1.242***  1.520*** 1.508*** 
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.049) (0.048) 
Bilateral  distance  -1.817*** -1.809***  -1.995*** -2.066*** 
 (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.17)  (0.16) 
Distance of exporter from world  0.286*  0.492***  2.371***  2.517*** 
  (0.16) (0.16)  (0.88) (0.88) 
Distance of importer from world  0.441***  0.444***  -1.441***  -1.343*** 
  (0.15) (0.15)  (0.40) (0.39) 
Bilateral  tariff  0.267*** 0.294***  0.891*** 0.972*** 
 (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
Relative import protection  0.113**  0.0938**  -0.190  -0.279** 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Relative export protection  -0.343***  -0.367***  -0.790***  -0.844*** 
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
NTBs of importer  -0.122***  -0.125***  -0.154*  -0.172** 
  (0.030) (0.029)  (0.085) (0.083) 
Landlocked  exporter  -0.299*** -0.293***  -0.499*** -0.475** 
 (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.17)  (0.19) 
Landlocked importer  -0.766***  -0.765***  -0.416*  -0.467** 
 (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.24)  (0.23) 
Contiguity  0.989*** 1.098***  1.787*** 1.795*** 
  (0.20) (0.20)  (0.58) (0.57) 
Common  language  0.983*** 0.936***  1.341*** 1.156*** 
 (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.23)  (0.23) 
Colonial relation  0.0936  0.139  2.452  3.030 
  (0.27) (0.26)  (1.90) (1.86) 
African exporter’s dummy  -0.321***  0.168*  0.894***  1.275*** 
 (0.075)  (0.088)  (0.22)  (0.22) 
Exporter’s phone density    0.171***    0.676*** 
   (0.021)   (0.16) 
Exporter’s road density    0.110***    0.542*** 
   (0.033)   (0.11) 
Constant  -44.73*** -43.41***  -55.15*** -55.74*** 
  (0.72) (0.73)  (2.90) (3.08) 
Observations  8713 8713  1914 1914 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A.4.  Log linear specification, 2004 
Coefficient Full  sample Low-income exporter sample
Logtrade  











Exporter’s GDP  1.208*** 1.191*** 1.283***  1.283***
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.069)  (0.069) 
Importer’s GDP  0.870***  0.874***  0.794***  0.794*** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.059)  (0.059) 
Bilateral distance  -1.319***  -1.314***  -1.109***  -1.109*** 
 (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
Distance of exporter from  1.059*** 1.174***  1.224  1.224 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  (1.47)  (1.47) 
Distance of importer from  -0.594*** -0.613***  -1.508***  -1.508*** 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.54)  (0.54) 
Bilateral tariff  -0.490***  -0.447***  0.124  0.124 
 (0.086)  (0.087)  (0.26)  (0.26) 
Relative import protection  0.0481  0.0428  -0.00797  -0.00797 
 (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
Relative export protection  0.493***  0.448***  -0.0812  -0.0812 
 (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.20)  (0.20) 
NTBs of importer  -0.0560  -0.0620*  -0.118  -0.118 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Landlocked exporter  -0.0877  0.0964  -0.0299  -0.0299 
 (0.098)  (0.100)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
Landlocked importer  -0.580***  -0.588***  -0.240  -0.240 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
Contiguity 1.011***  1.040***  0.803  0.803 
 (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.77)  (0.77) 
Common language  0.814***  0.772***  1.096***  1.096*** 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
Colonial relation  -0.416  -0.428  0  0 
 (0.30)  (0.31)  (0)  (0) 
African exporter’s dummy  -0.361***  -0.139  -0.0832  -0.0832 
 (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.29)  (0.29) 
Exporter’s phone density    0.157***     
   (0.030)     
Exporter’s road density    -0.0694*     
   (0.039)     
Constant -33.41***  -34.44***  -32.45***  -32.45*** 
 (0.83)  (0.88)  (4.05)  (4.05) 
Observations 3826  3826  661  661 
R-squared 0.68  0.68  0.47  0.47 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A.5.  Tobit regression, 2004 









Exporter’s GDP  1.283*** 1.266*** 1.394***  0.885***
 (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.085)  (0.11) 
Importer’s GDP  0.953***  0.956***  0.997***  1.007*** 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.069)  (0.065) 
Bilateral distance  -1.409***  -1.404***  -1.412***  -1.523*** 
 (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.20)  (0.20) 
Distance of exporter from  0.968*** 1.111***  0.807  -0.983 
 (0.22)  (0.22)  (1.52)  (1.51) 
Distance of importer from  -0.842*** -0.863***  -2.621***  -2.303*** 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.54)  (0.51) 
Bilateral tariff  -0.407***  -0.367***  0.484*  1.123*** 
 (0.090)  (0.091)  (0.29)  (0.28) 
Relative import protection  -0.0180  -0.0247  -0.286  -0.458** 
 (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.21)  (0.20) 
Relative export protection  0.512***  0.471***  -0.146  -0.727*** 
 (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.21)  (0.22) 
NTBs of importer  -0.107***  -0.112***  -0.272**  -0.306*** 
 (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Landlocked exporter  -0.160  0.00674  -0.333  -3.245*** 
 (0.097)  (0.10)  (0.25)  (0.48) 
Landlocked importer  -0.673***  -0.677***  -0.512  -0.467 
 (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.39)  (0.37) 
Contiguity 1.102***  1.122***  0.666  0.570 
 (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.85)  (0.81) 
Common language  0.875***  0.837***  1.040***  0.944*** 
 (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.34)  (0.33) 
Colonial relation  -0.646  -0.655     
 (0.49)  (0.49)     
African exporter’s dummy  -0.503***  -0.284**  -0.321  0.0146 
 (0.099)  (0.11)  (0.31)  (0.30) 
Exporter’s phone density    0.139***    -1.401*** 
   (0.034)    (0.19) 
Constant -35.84***  -36.65***  -33.76***  -0.386 
 (0.95)  (0.99)  (4.16)  (5.89) 
Exporter’s road density    -0.0343    1.867*** 
   (0.044)    (0.22) 
Observations 3974  3974  725  725 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure A.1.  Marginal impact of phone density, top-20 African countries 




































































Figure A.2.  Marginal impact of phone density, top-20 non-African countries 







































































Figure A.3.  Marginal impact of road density, top-20 African countries 
































































Figure A.4.  Marginal impact of road density on trade, top-20 non-African countries 
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